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And Business Cycles
The Foreign Experience
BOTH the academic and policy level, the study
of business cycles has been eclipsed in recent years.
This development probably stems from the fact that
in the industrial countries of the world, deep or pro-
longed recessions have not been a serious problem
since World War II. In the less developed countries,
the issue of economic growth holds the dominant posi-
tion in theoretical and policy discussion.
Although the urgency to understand and correct the
business cycle, which characterized professional and
government thinking some years ago, is no longer
present, it is still a subject worthy of inquiry. In the
first half of 1967 there were slowdowns of varying
degree in the economies of the United States, United
Kingdom, France, and Germany. Only Italy and Japan,
among the major industrial countries, grew at a satis-
factory rate.1
This article is another step in the long history of at-
tempts to explain the business cycle. In simple terms,
this explanation of the cycle is as follows: An increase
in the money supply eventually causes income and im-
ports to increase. The rise in imports leads to a decline
in the balance of payments, forcing the monetary au-
thorities to contract the money supply. Although the
purpose of this contraction is to strengthen the balance
of payments by reducing imports, it also has the effect
of reducing domestic income. The decline in imports
\vill eventually correct the balance of payments and
allow the authorities to switch again to an easymone-
tary policy. The resulting increase in money leads
again to income and imports growing. As long as this
sequence continues, there will be periodic fluctuations
‘The major difference between postwar business cycles and
prewar cycles is in the degree of severity. During the 193O’s the
peak-to-trough decline in per capita income was 25 per cent
in some countries, while in the 1950’s and 1960’s cyclical de-
clines in per capita income have been measured in fractions of
a per cent. Put in another way, the prewar business cycle can
best be visualized in terms of changes in the level of income,
while postwar cycles can best be viewed in terms of changes
in rate of growth of income. Reflecting this difference between
prewar and postwar business cycles, the description of cycles
in this article will be in terms of rates of change in income
rather than in terms of the level of income.
in income, imports, the balance of payments, and
money. If monetary policy were directed at contain-
ing domestic inflationary pressures (rather than wait-
ing for balance-of-payments problems to appear), this
sequence of events would be broken, and cyclical fluc-
tuations in income might be moderated in amplitude
and frequency.
It is the proposition of this article that monetary
policy followed by most of the countries of Europeand
Japan has been sensitive to balance-of-payments prob-
lems and that this is the major cause of most of the
business cycle fluctuations in the postwar period. The
remainder of this article is designed to substantiate
this proposition. First a model is presented which ex-
plains the observed economic behavior. (The model
is presented in a more technical form in the Appen-
dix.) The bulk of the articleconsists of an examination
of recent business cycles in Japan, Italy, Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, to see if the model
is consistent with that experience.
The Business Cycle Model
A model which attempts to explain any phenomenon
must be based on the behavior of the elemental deci-
sion-making units in that area. In economics, these are
the consuming household, the producing firm, and the
government authorities who make policy decisions.
There are four assumptions in this model regarding
behavior of the economy’s elemental decision-making
units.
(1) Money and Economic Activity First, it is assum-
ed that in any economy which has experienced rapid
growth, expectations of households and firms about the
future are optimistic, which gives them strong incen-
tives to invest arid consume. In this context, short-term
growth in production and income depends upon the
rate at which money and credit are made available to
the private sector. The rate of growth in money, there-
fore, determines the short-term growth rate in the
economy, and if there are fluctuations in the growth of





The monetary authorities will respond to an increase
in prices with a decrease in the growth in money, i.e.,
the relationship is negative. On the other hand, they
will respond to a balance-of-payments surplus with an
increase in the growth of money, i.e., the relationship
is positive. The length of time which it takes for either
prices or the balance of payments to affect these policy
decisions is a measure of the time lag between the
emergence of a problem and the decision of the au-
thorities to take corrective actions.
Change in money leads to a change in income. The
arrow indicates the direction of causality. The plus sign
above the arrow indicates that the relationship is posi-
tive; i.e., an increase in money will lead to an increase
in income, or a decrease in money will lead to a de-
crease in income. This relationship must not be con-
sidered as occurring instantaneously. It is quite reason-
able to expect thatthere will be some time lag between
the change in money and the resulting change in in-
come. It typically takes some time before investment
and consumption plans are reflected in actual spend-
ing flows.
Although this resembles the modern quantity theory
of money it differs from the usual presentation in that
it is based on a more restrictive set of assumptions. If
the forces which create strong private demand should
disappear, i.e., loss of optimistic expectationsby firms
and households, therate at which money is made avail-
able to the economy may not result in a predictable
change in income.
(2) Monetary Policy- The second assumption is in
regard to the behavior of the monetary authorities
who control growth in the money stock. Their policy
targets are either
a. to prevent inflation, i.e., stabilize the price level2.
b. to correct balance-of-payments deficits.








Altemative domestic policy targets like economic growth or
full employment are assumed to be dealt with by fiscal policy
and other stabilization tools.
An important policy issue is whether the monetary
authorities should respond primarily to external prob-
lems, such as balance-of-payments deficit, or to internal
problems such as a rise in prices. In general, the mone-
tary authorities have not been restrictive in the face of
moderate domestic inflation because of the fear it
would interfere with growth. Instead, monetary policy
has commonly become restrictive when there was a
balance-of-payments deficit, because the only way to
maintain a desired stock of international reserves
(short of devaluation) has been by taking restrictive
actions. For simplicity of explanation, it is assumed
here that the authorities in charge of monetary policy
respond either to price changes or to the balance of
payments, but not to both at the same time. (This as-
sumption will be considered in more detail below.)
(3) Balance-of-Payments Determinants. The third
relationship postulated does not represent a statement
about behavior of decision-making units in the usual
sense of the word. Rather, it provides a convenient
method of isolating the influences on the balance of
payments. The balance of payments can be defined as
follows-
Bal. of Pmts.~Exports—Imports+NetCapital Inflow.
In the short run (with which this business cycle
analysis is concerned) exports depend largely upon
external factors, such as the level of total demand in
foreign countries.a Imports are dependent upon the
level and growth in domestic income, while net capital
movements are influenced by both foreign and do-
aSome economists believe exports are influenced by business
cycle factors, growing slowly in periods of boom and rapidly
in periods of recession. There is little evidence to support this
position. But over a longer period than generally associated
with a 3-to-fl year business cycle, domestic factors probably
play a majorrole in the growth of exports. Changes in domestic
relative to foreign prices can have a very important impact
on both exports and imports. However, in the absence of de-
valuation, such price changes are gradual. Other factors,
such as the size of the capital plant, the productivity of labor,
the degree of innovation of the business community, etc., are
also of considerable importance in the long-term growth of
exports. However, in the fairly short run, export growth is
largely dependent upon total demand conditions in the rest of
the world.






A basic assumption of this model is that the balance
of payments is dominated by fluctuations in imports
and that exports and capital movements play a sub-
sidiary role. This allows us to say that cyclical balance-
of-payments problems are largely due to domestic
factors and not to external factors.
Under such circumstances, the relationship between
changes in imports and the balance of payments can






The balance of payments will be negatively related
to the change in imports because a rise in imports must
be paid for by drawing down foreign exchange re-
serves, creating a deficit in the balance of payments.
The time lag in this case is a measure of how long
imports would have to rise before they exceeded the
level of exports and net capital inflow and therefore
resulted in a deficit in the balance of payments.
(4) Price and Import Determinants. The final be-
havioral assumption in this model is that changes in








Changes in imports and prices are assumed to be
positively related to changes in income. When income
rises, there is an increase in the demand for all goods
and services, including those from abroad. The in-
creased income also puts upward pressure on prices.
In this ease there is not likely to be much of a time
lag between changes in income, and changes in prices
and imports.
4
A change in relative prices will also affect imports. However,
in the absence of devaluation, such changes are usually mod-
erate in the short run.
The Model. The preceding four statements repre-
sent a very simple set of assumptions about economic
behavior. If all four relations are presented together,
it would look as follows:
Change ~ Balance (+) Change
in of in
Imports —* Payments —* Money —*
There are two alternative transmission mechanisms
by which this model of economic behavior could
operate. If monetary policy is responsiveto pricecon-
siderations, the upper channel would operate. An in-
crease in income would lead to an increase in prices.
The price rise would induce the authorities to take
a restrictive monetary policy, causing income to de-
cline, reducing the pressure on prices, and allowing
the authorities to initiate an easy money policy.
If monetary policy is responsive to the balance of
payments, the lower channel would operate. A rise in
income in one time period will cause imports to in-
crease and, after some time lag, the balance of pay-
mentsto deteriorate. A weak external sector will cause
the authorities to implement a tight money policy,
which in time will reduce income. (Thus, an increase
in income in a previous period will lead to a decrease
in income in the present period.)
The decrease in income will cause imports to de-
crease and the balance of payments to improve. The
authorities will now end the tight money policy, and
income will increase. (Thus, a decrease in income in
the present period will lead to an increase in income
in some future period.)
In formal terms, both of these channels would lead
to cyclical fluctuations in income. However, as a prac-
tical matter, the channel which operates through the
balance of payments has a much sharper impact on
the cyclical fluctuations in income. This is true for two
reasons. First, price increases can usually be observed
to occur earlier than balance-of-payments weakness in
responseto a rise in imports, inducing an earlier mone-
tary response. Second, when a balance-of-payments
weakness occurs, it requires strong monetary actions
to prevent international reserves from falling below
Page 9some minimum desired level.5 A country which takes
frequent but moderate adjustments in money policy,
in the face of price increases, is less apt to have sharp
fluctuation in the growth in income than a country
which has less frequent but more abrupt changes in
policy.
This is illustrated by the business cycle experience
of Cermany and Japan, both of which have grown
rapidly in the last fifteen years. Germany has had only
one business cycle decline, while Japan has had four.
This is because the Germans have been very concern-
ed even about moderate domestic inflation, and have
taken prompt but modest, monetary actions \vhen
faced with price increases. As a result, the growth in
real product has been relatively smooth. On the other
hand, Japan has taken restrictive monetary actions
only when faced with a serious balance-of-payments
problem. To be successful in this case required a sharp-
ly restrictive monetary policy which would contract
income and imports.
The Evidence
The recent business cycle experience of several in-
dustrialized countries will be considered to see how
well the model explains actual business cycle devel-
opments.° This examaination excludes the United
States. Monetary policy in the United States has, at
different times, been responsiveto both domestic price
problems and to the balance-of-payments constraint.
However, the size of the United States and the role of
the dollar as the major reserve currency make a simple
application of this model difficult. Future studies along
the lines of this article will deal explicitly with the
United States.
In the accompanying charts, quarterly observations
of four strategic variables are presented for each coun-
try. Monetary policy is measured by quarterly per cent
changes in the money supply. The balance of payments
froni this Bank.
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is measured by the customs trade balance7, i.e., ex-
ports minus imports. Real output is measured by quar-
terly per cent changes in industrial production (quar-
terly GNP figures are not available in most cases), and
imports are measured as quarterly per cent changes
in the customs value of imports.
The peaks and troughs in the trade balance are in-
dicated by stars. The time between a peak and a trough
is a period of trade-balance weakness, and the time
between a trough and a peak is a period of trade-bal-
ance improvement or strength. The starred turning
points in the money time series indicate changes in
monetary policy which are assumed to be in response
to changes in the trade balance. A peak in the money
series represents a change toward tight money policy,
while a trough represents a change toward an easy
money policy. Changes in monetary policy, which are
strictly in responseto domestic factors, are notstarred.
For example, Germany did nothave a serious weakness
in the trade balance from 1951 to the second half of
1964. In this period monetary policy was obviously
not responsive to external factors. However, policy
was periodically tightened to contain domestic infla-
tionary conditions.
The stars on the production series represent the
turning points in domestic production which are pos-
tulated to be in response to the starred changes in
monetary policy. The import series is not starred; how-
ever, it can be observed that the cyclical pattern of
imports is much the same as that of production.
Ut can be observed that in general, the desired level of reserves
is below the actual level for countries with an experience of
incrcases in reserves (France, Italy, and Cennany), Thus, no
matter how large the stock of international resen’es, a sub-
stantial decline is considered undesirable by most monetary
authorities.
6
While the evidence presented in this article is impressionistic,
based on casual observations of certain economic time series
for each country, statistical tests have also been applied and
have yielded encouraging results. A inure comprehensive
analysis of the Japanese case has also provided quite satisfac-
tory results. Copies of a Japanese study, Monetary Policy and
the Business Cycle in Postwar Japan, are available on request
~The trade balance is taken as a proxy for the overall balance
of payments because the figures are easily and quickly avail-
able to both policy makers and the general public. The obvious
weakness of this procedure is that it disregards several signif-
icant components of the overall balance. For instance, a deficit
on the trade account might be offset by surplus on the invis-
ibles and/or capital account, and what would otherwise show
up in our analysis as a decline in a country’s international
reserves would, in reality, he nothing of the sort.
While recognizing this possibility, it should be remembered
the trade balance is the most volatile component of the bal-
ance of payments. The balance on invisibles tends to remain
rather constant from one period to the other. To the extent
it has a cyclical pattern, it is the same as that of the trade
balance. Likewise, long-term capital flows tend to move in
response to international differences in real rates of return on
productive factors and, consequently, does not exhibit much
short-term variance on the basis of business cycle factors.
Finally, short-term capital movements, while volatile, arise
primarily in response to international differences in interest
rates and cannot, therefore, he counted on with any degree of
certainty to counteract a deterioration of the trade balance for
an extended period. Consequently, a weakness in the trade
balance, regardless of whether it is accompanied by an im-
mediate decline in the stock of international reserves, is in-
dieative of weakness in the overall balance of payments. It
should be kept in mind, however, that it is not the level of the
trade balance but the direction in which it is moving that is
important.Japan
The model explains the Japanese business cycle
quite well. Japan has had three cyclical downturns in
production since 1956. Japan has also had three periods
when the trade balance deteriorated sharply and three
periods when monetary policy was tight. The timing
of these developments is consistent with the assump-
tions in our theoretical model, A sharp rise in imports
in the late boom phase of the business cycle, when
domestic sources of supply become scarce, leads to a
rapid deterioration in the trade balance with a two-to-
three-quarter time lag. The deterioration in the trade
balance (tier 3o nthe chart) was followed by a tight-
ening in monetary policy (tier 2 on the chart) and
with a short time lag, to deceleration in production
and imports (tier 1 on the chart)
The decline in imports results in an improvement
in the trade balance. This permits the monetary au-
thorities to ease their tight money policy, and produc-
tion and imports are allowed to resume their growth
rate. Monetary policycontinuesto be easyuntil another
balance-of-trade problem emerges.
As can be seen in the following table, the average
growth rate of the money stock was twice as rapid
between 1960 and 1964 than in the previous four-year
period.8 This acceleration of the money stock put a
considerable amount of pressure on the economy which
could not be met by domestic production which in-
creased at the same rate in each period. As a result,
prices and imports accelerated sharply. (Note the
similarity in the cyclical and secular patterns of money
and imports.) This acceleration in imports caused in-
ternational reserves to decline moderately at a time



























As a result of this generally easier monetary stance,
there were two periods of balance-of-payments \veak-
ness and two corresponding jusiness cycle declines in
5This period corresponds to the tenure of Mr. Ikeda as Prime
Minister of Japan. His major political slogan was to Double
National Income In Tea Years, In pursuit of this goal, lie fol-
lowed an aggressively easy monetary policy
Japan
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the 1960-64 period. In contrast, during the 1956-60
period of generally more restricted growth in money,
there was only one period of balance-of-payments
weakness and one business cycle decline. This implies
not onlythat monetary policy directed at the balance of
payments will lead to business cycle fluctuations, but
that the more expansionary the secular tone of policy,
the more frequent the cyclical downturns are likely to
be. (A more technical exposition of this process is











This point may be clarified by examining the most
recent Japanese business cycle downturn in some
detail. In 1962, a period of recovery in the trade bal-
ance, the monetary authorities introduced an easy
policy in order to encourage recovery of domestic
production. In late 1962 and early 1963, however, the
growth in the money stock was increased at a 40 per
cent annual rate. In previous periods of early cyclical













Page 11per cent. Production responded to this easing of mone-
tary policy about as quickly as in previous upturns.
However, imports, following the pattern of the growth
in money, accelerated more rapidly than in previous
upturns. This caused the trade balance to deteriorate
during 1963 and early 1964. The monetary authorities
were compelled again to restrain actively the growth
in the money supply, which pushed domestic produc-
tion down after only a very short period of growth.
It is fairly obvious that if the Japanese authorities
had continued this type of expansionary policy, it
would have led to additional fluctuations in the trade
balance and sharp and frequent cyclical movements
in domestic production. However, the 1963-64 experi-
ence apparently made them realize that an easy money
environment made business cycle fluctuations sharper.°
When the trade balance started to improve in the
last half of 1964 and into 1965, the monetary response
was very cautious and the degree of easing was far
more moderate than in the past. Although it took
longer for industrial production to pick up than in the
past, when it did so, it did not lead to rapid emergence
of domestic inflationary pressures. Thus, imports grew
onlymoderately in 1965 and 1966.
In the first half of 1967, Japan enjoyed a period of
rapid economic expansion, with industrial production
rising markedly. In spite of that domestic boom, im-
ports did not accelerate. However, because of weak-
ness in several of Japan’s major foreign markets, ex-
port growth has temporarily weakened and has caused
the trade balance to decline moderately. Monetary
policy became less expansionary in early 1967 and the
discount rate was increased in August. The trade ac-
count stopped deteriorating in the third quarter of
1967. The model would imply that monetary policy
will start easing again and domestic production will
exhibit only a modest decelerationin early 1968.
Italy
The Italian experience in the last decade is also
consistent with the relationships postulated in this
model. Italy has had two business cycles since 1956
and also two periods of weakness in the trade balance.
The timing of these events is consistent with our
model. The first cycle started in 1956 with a moderate
weakening in the trade balance which, in turn, led to a
moderate tightening of monetary policy and to a mod-
erate deceleration in domestic production. This mini-
9This expansionary policy could have also reduced the long-
term growth rate. Fluctuations in production reduced the sales
and profits of Japanese business and their incentives to under-
take new investments.
recession was sufficient to push imports down, leading
to moderate improvement in the trade balance from
the middle of 1957, and substantial improvement in
1958. As a result, monetary policy eased toward the
end of 1957 and the domestic economy started to re-
sume its growthrate from early 1958.
The Italian monetary authorities followed a rela-
tively moderate policy through early 1961. However,
from the middle of 1961 until early 1963, monetary
policy became more expansionary, perhaps because
of the emergence of a new political coalition in the
government. Domestic production had been growing
at a very satisfactory 12 per cent annual rate from
1959 to 1961, and the expansionary policy was not able
to increasethat growth rate. As a matter of fact, growth
in domestic production was somewhat slower during
the period of expansionary monetary policy. How-
ever, total demand pressures generated by easy money
pushed imports up sharply in 1962 and the first half
of 1963, forcing the trade balance into substantial
deficit.
The 1962-SB decline in the trade balance was much
larger than from 1956 to 1957, and, as a result, the
Italy
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Page 12authorities seemed to have felt that monetary policy
also had to be more restrictive. The money supply,
which at its peak in the first quarter of 1963 was grow-
ing at a 20 per cent annual rate, declined to a 4 per
cent annual growth rate by the fourth quarter of the
year.
The sharp decline in the growth of money had a
substantial effect on domestic production, which fell
from an 11 per cent increase in the second quarter of
1963 to a9per cent rate of decrease in the second
quarter of 1964. This was associated with a more than
proportional decline in imports, which led to an im-
provement in the trade balance from the first half of
1964, and allowed the authorities to ease monetary
policy from the second half of 1964.
This easier money policy was not as excessive as in
1962 and early 1963. The growth in the money supply
was kept significantly below what it had been prior to
the decline in the trade balance in 1963, In spite of
this more conservative monetary policy, domestic
production responded promptly and resumed a 10-12
per cent growth rate in 1965 and 1966. Although im-
ports responded to the growth in production, it was
not as sharp as in previous periods of early cyclical
upswing. As a result, the trade balance continued
strong through the middle of 1967.
In several important respects the monetary policy
experiences of Japan and Italy were similar in the last
cycle. In each country a more expansionary policy than
usual was initiated (prior to the most recent cycle)
which did nothing to stimulate the real growth rate
but did trigger an acceleration in imports and a decline
in the trade balance. In each country the monetary au-
thorities seemed to have concluded that an unusually
expansionary policy could not contribute to the real
growth rate, but only add to the instability of the econ-
omy. As a result, the policies followed in the last two
years or so have been relatively moremoderate in each
country.
German
In the German case, the policy authorities were
more sensitive to domestic price increases than was
the case in Japan or Italy. The model would imply that
under such circumstances Germany would be less
subject to business cycle fluctuations. This has been
the case. Germany is now in the midst of its first
cyclical downturn in sixteen years. From 1951 until
1964, Germany did not experience any serious weak-
ness in its balance of trade or unusually sharp cyclical
movements in production. The success at keeping the
economy from overheating, prevented an acceleration
Germany





































1956 3957 195$ 5959 1960 1941 1942 3983 1964 IdS 3966 1967 0
lh,,,,1t,F,i,g3’s, l,’yq ~ 4,,,’’, Ii,,, 3,,,, p,., q ,‘,,
l’I oth,,, d,e a
*1,4 ,itp.. ~ ‘b 1, eQ sl.,,do ,.,~,doi,e4,b,k,,,e,,o 4,,,,,,,
Se 4 olaF, ‘JO CD
of imports and kept the trade balance from weaken-
ing. As a result, Germany was able to avoid the ne-
cessity of a sharply restrictive monetary policy. Thus,
a policy which was not explicitly directed at achieving
external stability, turned out, in fact, to make an im-
portant contribution to such stability.
With the trade position in reasonable balance,1°it is
obvious that monetary policy did not need to be sensi-
tive to external consideration. It was unnecessary for
the German economy to be subject to sharp periodic
deflationary policies. By taking small corrective actions
early, large corrective actions were not necessary at a
later date.
In spite of the continuation of a conservative mone-
tary policy during the middle of the 1960’s, imports
accelerated and the trade balance deteriorated in 1964
and 1965.
Even though Germany’s holdings of international
1O”Reasonable balance” in the sense that there was little devi-






Page 13reserves were unusually large ($7.9 billion at the end
of 1964), she responded to a deterioration in her trade
balance with the same vigor as Japan, whose inter-
national reserves were clearly inadequate ($2.0 billion
at the end of 1964). The time lag between the deteri-
oration of the trade balance and the tightening of
monetary policy was a relatively long one. This lag in
response is probably due to the fact that the decline
in the trade balance started from an historic high trade
surplus, and during the first few quarters was consider-
ed a healthy adjustment. When the trade surplus slid
below its normal range of about $1.5 billion, the mone-
tary authorities became concerned.
There was a sharp deceleration in the money supply
in early 1965. As would be expected from this model,
the rate of growth of both industrial production and
imports declined substantially in the face of tight
money, and by the middle of 1965 the decline in the
trade balance had been halted. The deterioration,
however, had carried the trade balance to its lowest
level in ten years, and a restrictive monetary policy
was maintained through mid-1966.
This experience again illustrates the priority given
balance-of-payments considerations by many foreign
monetary authorities. Even with a large level of in-
ternational reserves, Germany accepted a substantial
decline in the rate of growth in domestic output to
correct a deterioration in the trade balance. Only
in late 1966 and early 1967, after the trade balance
was again in substantial surplus, did the authori-
ties allow the money supply to increase, Our model
would indicate a continuing easy monetary policy
throughout this year, which should stimulate the re-
newed growth in domestic output and employment in
1968.
France
France has experienced two business cycles since
1958 and is probably now entering its third cyclical
decline. In each ease, the behavior of industrial pro-
duction, the trade balance, and the money supply have
conformed to the pattern postulated in the theoretical
analysis.
After the franc devaluation’1 in late 1958, the French
trade balance, facilitated by a rapid advance in ex-
ports, moved from deficit to substantial surplus. The
money supply expanded rapidly as the inflow of for-
eign exchange substantially broadened the reserve
13
A devaluation, even though a discretionary policy available
to the monetary authorities, is considered to be exogenous
under the systeen postulated by this model. As such, the
model makes no attempt to explain or predict such an event.
base of the banking system. Prices began to rise, and
both industrial production and imports rose rapidly.
By the end of 1961, definite softness began to develop
in the trade balance. While the monetary authorities
had followed a relatively passive discretionary policy,
the operation of a mechanism similar to the interna-
tional gold standard largely determined the growth
in money. Passively allowing changes in the interna-
tional reserve to dominate growth in the money stock
accomplished the same result as if the Bank of France
had followed a discretionary policy in response to the
balance of payments.
The gradual weakening in the French trade position
from late 1961 was accompanied by a gradual tighten-
ing of monetary conditions beginning in mid-1962. As
would be expected, production and imports decel-
erated by late 1963, leading to an improvement in the
trade balance beginning in mid-1964.
Monetary policy was moderately easier after re-
covery in the trade balance in late 1964 and 1965, and
industrial production rose sharply. However, the limit-
ed monetary expansion kept inflationary pressures con-
tained, and imports failed to increase as rapidly as in
previous periods of early cyclical upswing. Despite
France
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Page 14this relatively mild increase in imports, poor perform-
ance in exports during 1965 and 1966 caused the trade
balance to soften, and a decline was initiated which
continued through the first quarter of 1967.
In response to this most recent weakening in the
trade balance, French authorities have operated, since
mid-1966, to decelerate the money stock, The tighter
money conditions have resulted in a decelerationin in-
dustrial production and imports.
The trade deficit improved significantlyin the second
quarter of 1967, recovering more than half of the
loss suffered in the previous six quarters of decline. On
the basis of the model, one would expect monetary
policy to now be easy and production to recover in the
near future.
United Kingdom
The U.K. experience does not conform to the be-
havioral assumptions of the model as well as the other
countries considered. Specifically, the monetary au-
thorities havenot consistently responded to a weakness
in the trade balance with a policy of tight money.’2
However, this piece of contrary evidence with respect
to the behavior of the model actually strengthens its
reasonableness. The monetary response to the trade
balance is a discretionary action by most monetary
authority and not an automatic response. They could
have decided to ignore the external position in deter-
mining policy. The fact that the authorities in most
countries did not ignore the international trade posi-
tion while the United Kingdom attempted to ignore it,
shows the relative consequence of both acts. The other
countries have had only temporary balance-of-pay-
ments problems, while the United Kingdom has ex-
perienced serious weakness in her trade balance and
speculative attacks against her currency for the last
three years.
The U.K. trade balance has shown weakness three
times in the last decade: in 1957, 1960, and most re-
cenfly from 1964 through 1967. There have also been
three cyclical declines in the U.K. domestic produc-
tion. The 1957 weakness in the trade balance did not
induce a restriction in the money supply, although
there was a cyclical decline in industrial production




The average postwar growth rate of the United Kingdom has
been less than that of any of the major industrial countries.
This has affected the expectations of consumers and produc-
ers, They are not as optimistic about the future as the other
Europeans, Japanese, or even Americans. Thus, the basic
economic behavior which links money to income may not
hold with respect to the United Kingdom,
United Kingdom
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In 1960 a restrictive monetary policy was introduced
because of a deterioration in the trade balance, caus-
ing domestic production and imports to decline. The
trade balance improved rather promptly in late 1960
and 1961, Monetary policy eased and production re-
covered, but grew at a very modestrate through 1962.
Therewasconsiderablecontroversy within the United
Kingdom in the early 1960’s about the appropriateness
of what was called a “stop-and-go” policy, allowing the
balance of payments tail to wag the domestic economic
dog. The resulting fluctuations in income, prices, and
interest rates were alleged to have weakened the sec-
ular growth in domestic production. For this reason,
monetary policy received considerable criticism.
Perhaps in response to this criticism the money sup-
ply accelerated beginning inmid-1962. Production and
imports accelerated beginning in early 1963 causing the
trade balance to start weakening in late 1963. This
weakness has continued through 1967. Public debate
has attributed the unusual length of this trade weak-
ness to the policy makers’ decision to avoid applying
restrictive policies. The deterioration in the U.K’s
trade position was obvious as early as the first quarter
of 1964, while the introduction of a restrictive mone-
tary policy cannot be observed until the first quarter of
Page 151966. This is about a two-year lag in the response of
monetary policy to a weakness in the trade position.13
The “Tory” Government, which was in power until
October1964, was probablyreluctant to take restrictive
actions because of impending general elections, The
succeeding Labor Government, in the past as the op-
position party, criticized the Troy Government for
“stop-and-go” economic policy. The new labor govern-
ment hoped to avoid a substantial slowdown in the
domesticeconomy by attemptingto correct the balance
of payments by means which would not require con-
tracting the whole economy.
The first action of the Labor Government was to
impose an additional 15 per cent duty on almost all
imports in November, 1964. The initial effect of this
action was, as expected, a reduction in imports. How-
ever, because domestic demand had not been signif-
icantly restrained, production continued at only a
slightly reduced rate, and import growth was resumed
in the second quarter of 1965.
Although a ceiling was imposed on bank credit in
1965, this did not start to cramp the liquidity position
of firms and households until the first quarter of 1966.
Monetary policy was unusually restrictive in the
second and third quarters of 1966. Industrial produc-
tion and imports began to show some weakness in the
first half of 1966, and decline in the second half of the
year.’4 This softness in imports, combined with an im-
pressive growth in exports in the last half of 1966, sub-
stantially strengthened the trade balance in the fourth
quarter of 1966. This improvement, however, proved
very temporary, as the trade position again weakened
sharply in the first half of 1967’~
13
The real lag in the response of monetary policy may have
been more or less than two years. Data on U.K. money supply
are only published for four days of the year since 1964. They
are: March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31.
Data for all other countries are available at least once a
month, and for the United States, daily. Because data for
any one day can be biased either up or down by random
events, percentage changes in the U.K. money stock show




A drastic and widely reported set of administrative restric-
tions were imposed in 1966. In the April budget message,
a selective emnloyment tax was proposed to go into effect in
the fall. In July, an absolute freeze was imposed on wages,
other income sources, and prices. As drastic as these actions
were, they took place when production and imports were
already weakening.
tm5
Foreign confidence in the value of the British pound sterling
has moved in line with the strength of the trade balance.
When the trade balance deteriorated sharply in 1964, there
was a large speculative attack against sterling which was met
lay a ~aoge drawing irussa die IlviF plus support rrom foreIgn
central banks. There was a moderate renewal of the spec-
ulative attack in 1965 because the improvement in the
trade balance was not progressing as fast as had been expect-
Improvement in the trade position in the last half
of 1966 led to some easing in monetary policy, as in-
dicated by an acceleration in the money stock from
the fourth quarter of 1966. The central bank discount
rate was reduced in three successive stages from 7 per
cent in January 1967 to 5.5 per cent in May. Industrial
production, which had declined in the second half of
1966, responded to the stimulus with a modest im-
provement toward the middle of 1967.
Although imports have fluctuated sharply in late
1966 and early 1967, they have shown a moderate net
increase in the twelve months ending September
1967.16 Exports, on the other hand, have declined in
recent months. This was an important cause of the
softening in the trade balance in the first three quar-
ters of 1967.
The recent economic experience of the United King-
dom presents an interesting exception to the model,
The most recent softening in the U.K. trade balance
has been onlypartially due to a rise in imports. A major
factor has been the fall in export demand. The model
assumes a steady growth in exports, because the post-
war experience of most industrial countries has been of
this nature. Until now, the cyclical declinein income of
most industrial countries has been relatively moderate,
and, therefore, developments in no one country have
caused serious disruption in the export performance of
other countries. However, in late 1966 and 1967 there
were simultaneous weakenings in the economies of
the United States, France, and Germany, as well as the
United Kingdom. Although the cyclical decline in each
case has been moderate, the cumulative impact has
had a significant effect on the exports of the United
Kingdom, which trades very heavily with these coun-
tries.
Gonclusion
In general, the business cycle developments abroad,
which are reviewed above, can be understood reason-
ably well on the basis of the highly simplified model
(Continued from Cot. 1)
ed, The weakening in the trade balance in the middle of
1966 resulted in a very heavy speculative attack against
sterling, which required substantial support from other for-
eign central banks. The sharp improvement in the trade
balance in the last half of 1966 caused a reversal in specula-
lion against sterling in the early months of 1967, This
allowed the Bank of England to repay most of the loans to
the foreign banks by May of 1967. When the trade balance
showed another sharp deterioration in the first half of 1967,
speculation again developed against sterling in the summer.
-‘~Ixnponsdecelerated In die mnlourns preceding removal of d
10 import surcharge in November, and accelerated rapidly im-
mediately after the tax was dropoed- This event would he
considered as exogenous to the workings of our model.
Page 16developed in the first part of the article. However, it
should be kept in mind that this model does not fit all
countries or all business cycle movements. It is most
useful when monetary policy is intimately linked with
the target of balance-of-payments equilibrium, and
when fluctuations in the balance of payments are due
largely to internal ratherthan external causes. Whether
this model will continue to provide a useful frame-
work for understanding future business cycle develop-
ments depends upon whether the special assumptions
made in the model continueto be applicable.
1. If the optimistic expectations about the future
which have characterized investment and consumption
decisions are impaired, then the tremendous thrust of
private demand forces which have made monetary
policy so important will not be present. It that case,
the relationship between money and income may no
longer hold, and a more complex set of economic fac-
tors would have to be considered in determining the
short-run movements in income and production. In a
period of depressed private expectations, a national
income analysis along more traditional Keynesian lines
may be more appropriate.
2. If the present system of fixed exchange rates
should be abandoned, this would free monetary policy
from explicitly responding to balance-of-payments
considerations. Although one can never predict what
is in store tomorrow, such a development is not given
serious consideration by current policy leaders.
3. If fluctuations in the balance of payments are
caused by external rather than internal factors, the
balance of payments will no longer be dominated by
import changes. In the last fifteen years, fluctuations
in imports (and therefore domestic factors) have
dominated the balance of payments in the countries
considered in this article, while exports have experi-
enced a relatively steady growth. This favorable ex-
port experience will continue as long as two factors
are present.
(a) The major industrial countries of the world
experience only mild business cycles. This
will keep their imports from declining over a
long period, and the exports of other eoun-
tries will grow with relative stability.
(b) The business cycle patterns of a large group
of industrial countries have generally not
moved simultaneously with one another. If
the pattern should coincide in the future,
then even if the cyclein each country is mild,
the cumulative impact on another country’s
exports could be substantial. This seems to
have been a major factor in the most recent
weakness in the U.K. trade position. It may
also have been a contributory factor in the
recentweakness in the tradebalance of Japan
and France.
There are two major implications of this model: (1)
A monetary policy which is responsive onlyto balance-
of-payments factors will lead to fluctuations in do-
mestic income and to larger fluctuations in the bal-
ance of payments than would be the case if monetary
policy was directed toward achieving domestic price
stability. The reason for this is fairly obvious. If fluct-
uations in the balance of payments are caused by
domestic factors, then a policy which directly stabi-
lizes the domestic economy would also stabilize the
balance of payments. (2) The more expansionary the
monetary policy, the sharper the fluctuations in income
and in the balance of payments.
Recent Japanese and Italian experiences confirm
this second result. In each country an expansionary
monetary policy led immediately to deterioration in
the balance of payments and to the need to reimpose
restrictive policy, causing a contraction in domestic
production. An expansionary monetary policy within
the context of thismodel is highly unstable.
If monetary policy, however, is responsive to domes-
tic inflationary pressures, as well as to the balance-of-
payments factors, it may well avoid the cycle which is
inherent in the model, This can be seen from the Ger-
man experience over the last decade and a half. Mone-
tary policy was made moderately restrictive on fre-
quent occasionsin order to contain domestic inflation-
ary pressures. Although this led to some moderate
fluctuations in production, they were not sharp enough
to be labeled as business cycle downturns until 1966.
MIcHAEL W. KERAN
The Appendix to this article begins on next page.
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The underlying structure and rationale for this model
is presented in more technical terms in this Appendix.
Money and Economic Activity In formulating our theo-
retical model, short-tenn changes in income are postu-
lated to depend on the rate at which money is made avail-
able to the private sector, This relationship is expressed by
the following structural equation.1
1. a, + a (M)t-m
The reason for adopting the quantity theory of money
approach rather than the more conventional income-ex-
penditure is hecause it is believed to correspond more ac-
curately to the observed developments in the postwar
period.
Most industrial countries have enjoyed a prolonged
period of relative prosperity since 1950, free from protract-
ed declines in income or severe inflationary pressures. As a
result of this solid pattern of experience, the expectations of
households and firms, concerning the future, have become
generally optimistic, With interest rates higher than in
prewar years, the speculative and precautionary demand
for cash balances has become minimal. The incentive of
households and firms to maintain a strong liquidity position
in expectation of future losses of income is no longer very
strong.
Under these circumstances the public’s desired cash bal-
ances tend to be largely based on transactions needs, which
make the demand for money a function of such economic
variables as income and wealth. Assuming that the authori-
ties can control the supply of money, ifactual cash balances
are changed by monetary policy, the public will he forced
to hold a different stock of money than it desired at pres-
ent levels of income and interest rates. In their efforts to
reestablish a desired cash balance, households and firms
will change their spending decisions. This will affect the
demand for goods, and, therefore, production and income
as well as the demand for securities and interest rates.
If future growth in income and production should be
slower than in the last fifteen years, or if a major \vorld-
wide recession were to develop, perhaps the assumptions
which underlie this version of thc quantity theory would
no longer apply. In such a ease, the Keynesian income-
expenditure approachmight be a superior method ofdeter-
miningthe level of income in the short run.
Determinants of Monetary Policy The authorities in
charge of monetaiy policy are assumed to respond either
to domestic price changes or to balance-of-payments con-
siderations. It is assumed that policy cannot simultaneously
be utilized to achieve both objectives. Thus, in periods
tTime lags in this and subsequent equations indicate the fisct
that relationships between an independent variable (like M)
and a dependent variable (like Y) are not instantaneous.
The exact duration of time lag can only be determined by
~ statistical analysis of each case. If the equation reads
Yr = a, a, ( M )t~, it should be interpreted as follows: If
is third,quarter of 1967, then t-2 would be the first quarter
of 1967. Yt will increase by an amount equal to a, v1os a
times (M ) t.,. If (M) increased by 5 per cent, then Vt will
increase by a,+ a1(S).
when the balance of payments (B) dominates policy, it
could he described as follows:
2a. Mt = b,±b1
(B)t-o
If price changes (P) dominate policy, it would be stated as
follows:
2b. ?1t = b2 b~ (P)1-,
This is not to imply that achievement of one goal, such
as price stability, would not contribute to achieving the
other goal, or that the authorities could not shift goals. It
only implies that they are concerned with one goal at a
time. The evidence presented with this model indicates
that the authorities in the countires considered are mainly
concerned with the balance of payments. Within the con-
text of price rises in the past fifteen years, most of these
authorities have not beers overly concerned with price in-
creases.
Equations 2a and 2b are expressions of the preferences
of the monetary authorities. As such, they may not only
shift between policy objectives, but also may respond to
the same policy objective in different ways at different
times. Such changes in emphasis are exogenous to the
model, An example may help clarify this point. In the
case of Japan, monetary policy was more expansionary
in the 1960-64 period than in the 1956-60 period (60 per
cent versus 120 percent increase in money) because an cx-
pnusiotnist minded primeminister was in office. This change
to a more expansionary monetary policy did not mean that
the balance-of-payments constraint was ignored. It did
mean that the values of (b,) and (b1) were larger in the ex-
pansionary period than in the less expansionary period.
This can be seen from the following regressions taken from
Japanese data: (Figures in pnrenthesis are standard errors).
1956-60 (16 quarters)
Mt = 2.7±.09 (B)t-i
(.02)
1960-64 (16 quarters)






In general, the more expansionary the policy, the larger
the value of (b1), because the policy authorities must be
even more sensitive to balance-of-payments deterioration in
such periods.
Balance-of-Payments Determinants The balance of pay-
ments is usually defined by the following identity:
Balance of Payments = Exports — Imports +
Net Capital Inflow.
In this analysis, however, the balance of payments is postu-
lated to depend only upon the direction and rate of change
in imports.
3. Br = e,— c~(1n)r-p
Page 18An increase in imports leads to a
balance-of-payments deficit; i.e., the
relationship is negative. The defini-
tional relationship between the bal-
ance of payments and imports is of
course, in the same time period. Flow-
ever, the behavioral relationship postu-
lated in equation 3 between the bal-
ance of payments and imports has a
time lag. This time lag is a statistical
artifact. It results from comparing
rates of change in n flow (imports)
with the level of a residual (the bal-
ance of payments). A time series,
which is otherwise synchronous to another time series,
would appear to lead if measured as arate of change.
Price and Import Determinants Changes in national in-
come are assumed to affect both prices and imports in a
positive way. This would be stated as follows:
4a. lint = d0±d1
(Y)
t
4b. Pt = dt ±d1
(Y)t
When income rises at its full-employment growth rate or
less, the pressure for price increases is weak. Thus, the
price cofficient (d1) is assumed to be less than (1.0). On
the other hand, the value of the coefficient (d,) is assumed
to be greater than (1.0) as both theincome and substitution
effects tend to push imports up with arise in income and to
push imports down with a fall in income,
Difference Equation This model of business cycle devel-
opments can be analyzed in formal mathematical terms by
the use of difference equation techniques. The solution of
the difference equation traces out a path over time. This
path may have a cyclical pattern, depending upon the
values of the coefficients in the model. Because monetary
policy is postulated to respond either to balance-of-pay-
ments considerations or to changes in prices, there are two
alternative versions of this model. The first version in which
monetary policy responds to the balance of payments can
be expressed fonnally with four structural equations drawn
from the previous discussion.
1. Yt = ao±ai(M)t-n
2a. Mt = b,±b±(B)t.n
3. Bt = c,—c’ (Im)t-p
4a. Imt = d0 ±dt (Y)t
The reduced form of this system of equations is as follows:






The rate of change in income (t) in any tune period (t)
depends upon the rate of change in income in some prev-
ious t~imneperiod (t-z). In these circumstances the expression
for (Y)t will have the properties of a homogeneous first
order difference equation because whatever the size of
If the value of A1 is positive, ie., greater than zero, then
the rate of change in income (Y) will not have a cyclicjil
pattern. If the value of A~is negative, the time path of (Y)
will oscillate in aregular cyclical pattern. In this latter case
there are three possible types of cycles. If the value of
A’ is equal to minus one (Figure A), the cyclical path of
(Y) will be of constant amplitude. Ifthe value of A, is less
than zero but grpter than minus one (Figure B), the
cyclical path of (Y) will be damped with the fluctuations
becoming smaller. If A1 is less than minus one (its absolute
value is greater than minus one), the cyclical path of (Y)
will be explosive, with the fluctuations becoming larger in
each succeeding period (Figure C).
On a priori grounds, we cnn postulate that the value of
A1 in our model of the business cyclewill be negative. This
is because in equation 3 the value c~is negative. An
increase in imports will decrease the balance of payments.
As the coefficients in all the other equations are positive,
the product of (aihc’di = A,) will be negative.
From the experience of the postwar period, we know
that there have been no explosive business cycles; thus,
the value of At for all of the countries considered in this
model is most likely between zero and minus one. (Figure
B) The reason that the actual postwar business cycles have
not damped toward zero is that exogenous events, like cur-
rency devaluation, internntional crises, natural disasters,
etc., also affect imports, balance of payments, and income.
If monetary policy becomes more expansionary, the
value of the coefficient b1 will be larger; that is, there will
be a larger increase in the money supply for any given
improvement in the balance of payments. A larger value
for b, will increase the absolute value of A1, As the absolute
value of At becomes larger and approaches the value of
minus one, the business cycle will also exhibit a larger
amplitude. Thus, the moreexpansionary is monetarypolicy,
the sharper the fluctuations in income,
The second version in which monetary policy is domi-
nated by domestic price considerations, can be expressed
in three structural equations.
1. Yr=ao-l-ni(M)t-m
2b. Mt = b2 — b~ (P)r.,
4b. Pt = dt ±d3 (Y)r
the time lag (t-z), thq value A(Y)t-~.± A0 uniquely deter-
mines the value of Y~.The value of At determines the
cyclical properties of the model.
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and z = m±o.
In formal terms this version of the model has the same
cyclical properties as the first version; i.e., both A, and A~
are negative. There are, however, several important dif-
ferences which make this version of the model exhibit
considerably less cyclical movement. First, the lag sti-uc-
ture is shorter in this model. In afonnnl sense this is true,
because there are only two lags in this version (z = in ±o),
while there are three lags in the previous version
(z = in ±n±p). In an economic sense, the shorter time
lag is due to monetary policy respondingdirectly to changes
in prices, while in the first version it responds to an in-
This article is available as Reprint Series No. 25.
crease in imports only, after the consequences of this in-
crease are reflected in a deterioration in the balance of
payments. Second, the response mechanism in the second
version is smaller than in the first version; i.e., the absolute
value of A1 will be closer to zero than the absolute value
of A1. This is because the value d1 will be smaller than the
value of d~ for reasons which have already been mentioned.
Also, the value of bt will be less than the value of bt be-
cause the policy response to a domestic problem which has
been recognized and dealt with in its early stages can be
more moderate than the policy response to an external
problem toward ~vhich the authorities are very sensitive for
international reasons.
Because the absolute value of A1 is typically smaller than
the absolute value of At, the cyclical fluctuations in income
svill be smaller if monetary policy respondsto price changes
than if it responds to balance of payments considerations.
A monetary policy which takes prompt but moderate
action, will havea smaller effect on the business cycle than
a policy which takes infrequent but sharp actions.
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